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In 2019, youth took to the street to express their fears and ambitions in relation to climate
change. Alongside, many adult and senior citizens expressed their solidarity. While the
media present environmental issues as being generationally dividing, we know little about
potential differences between generations in terms of environmental attitudes. In this
paper, we analyze data collected in the framework of street demonstrations in Switzerland
and longitudinal data collected in the Swiss population. Our analyses of survey data on
climate strike demonstrators in Switzerland show that while the early demonstrations
attracted mostly youth, the age composition of climate strike demonstrators becamemore
diverse over time increasingly includingmembers of different generations. Furthermore, we
explore how age differences evolved over the last 20 years using the Swiss Household
Panel data. Our analyses show that the share of individuals who favor the environment over
the economy is greater among younger generations and that the climate strike generation
stands out with the largest share of pro-environmental attitudes. However, all generations
have moved in parallel over the last twenty years following a non-linear but generally
upward trend illustrating that the political context affects all generations. Overall, our
analyses contribute to understanding incremental changes in public attitudes in the
environmental area and the role played by generational renewal in these regards.
Keywords: environmental attitude, climate strikes, youth, age, generations
INTRODUCTION
In 2019, young people across European countries took to the streets to express their environmental concerns.
In particular, school and university students organized numerous protest events during that year. In
Switzerland,many of these protest events took the formof climate strikes organized in several cities across the
country on at least 18 occasions since December 2018. This wave of protest characterized by regular strikes
anddemonstrations culminatedwith the demonstration that took place inBern on September 28, 2019which
gathered around 100,000 protesters coming from thewhole country. This demonstrationwas one of themost
sizable protest events in Switzerland since the Second World War. In their reports, the media have put a
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describing the mobilization as being a youth movement.2 The media
framed it as youth protest, thus, suggesting that the climate is a
preoccupation mostly of young people.
While youth were instrumental in initiating the movement, we
know little—beyond media reports—about the age distribution of
participants in these demonstrations (apart from the two reports
from the climate strike international team, see Wahlström et al.,
2019; de Moor et al., 2020). It is likely that the characteristics of
participants to these events evolved as demonstrations became
larger over time. The demonstrations could draw from
environmental activists who participated in previous waves of
mobilization and/or from a broader audience of citizens
sensitized to the environmental question in the last decades.
Research shows that social movements durably shape the
action repertoires of those who engage in protest during their
formative years, individuals who came of age during the 60s and
70s remain the most active generation in the streets (Caren et al.,
2011; Grasso, 2014; Giugni and Grasso, 2019). In addition, over
time, social movements have broad cultural impacts and
contribute to important shifts in public opinion (Amenta and
Polletta, 2019). Social movements shape the political attitudes of
those who engage in protest but more generally those of broad
segments of the population (Rochon, 2000). In fact, research on
public opinion shows relatively little polarization along
generational lines about environmental issues (Kissau et al.,
2012; Franzen and Vogl, 2013; Beiser-McGrath and Huber,
2018; Gray et al., 2019).
However, given the unprecedented nature of the climate strike
movement, it is likely that these findings from previous studies no
longer apply. In other words, the generational gap in pro-
environmental attitudes might have widened over the last few
years and that current youth generation displays different
opinions on environmental issues as compared to other
generations. After all, previous youth generations have not
initiated environmental movements, so maybe there is
something specific about the current youth generation. At
least, this is the narrative expressed in the media, which
characterized the demonstrations as youth events and insisted
on generational differences on environmental issues. Given the
lack of studies on the age composition of the climate strike
movement and the absence of more recent analysis of the
generational gaps in environmental attitudes that would
include the current youth generation, we propose to study the
following research questions. First, what is the composition in
terms of generations of the climate strike demonstrations?
Second, to what extent the generation who initiated the
climate strike differs from other generations in terms of pro-
environmental attitudes, today and when these older generations
were young?
Answering these questions enables to characterize the current
environmental movement in terms of generations engaged in the
events they organize and to assess potential generational
cleavages around environmental issues in Switzerland by
looking at levels of support for these issues across generations
and how they evolve over time. Is the fact that youth initiated the
movement linked to their biographical availability and propensity
to protest? Or, does it reflect the fact that today’s young
generation has specific preferences that differ from previous
generations? These questions speak to the literatures on social
movements, as well as to the literature on public opinion. The
literature on social movements puts emphasis on youth
biographical availability (Wiltfang and McAdam, 1991;
Corrigall-Brown, 2011) and highlights the continued protest
potential of the social movement generation (Caren et al.,
2011). Whereas, public opinion research tends to link age with
specific interests associated with life cycles (Andor et al., 2018) or
contextual factors (Gray et al., 2019) that shape the specific
preferences of age groups.
The climate strike demonstrations offer an opportunity to
analyze generational effects on participation in events associated
with the environmental movement. We test these effects in a
country where the environmental movement has organized many
protest events during the last decades. Hence, in a context where
the environmental movement contributed to shaping the action
repertoires and environmental preferences of different
generations. Switzerland represents an interesting case study
for two reasons. First, the demonstrations related to the Friday
for the Future movement have attracted very large numbers of
demonstrators. In comparative perspective and relative to its
population size, Switzerland is one of the countries with the
highest rate of participation in these demonstrations.3 Second, it
represents a case in which the environmental movement has a
long history (see section 2 below) and in which this movement
has been institutionalized already in the 1970s.4 Switzerland
represents a case in which large differences across generations
are less likely.
Our empirical analysis consists of two parts. First, we explore
the generational composition of the climate strike
demonstrations, in the early phase of the movement and
6 months later, to understand who the climate strike
demonstrators are. Second, using longitudinal data, we
examine how widespread is support for the environment
across different generations in the Swiss population. Our
results indicate that while climate strike demonstrations had a
high proportion of youth in March 2019, a majority of the
participants to the climate strike events in September were
aged 35 years or more. Thus, they are not part of the climate
strike generation. This shows the ability of the movement to bring
large shares of the population to the streets, but also its
mischaracterization by the media. The analysis of panel data
shows that the climate strike generation holds more pro-
2For instance, on March 15 2019, one of Le Temps headlines is: « Face à “l’urgence
climatique,” la jeunesse s’est emparée de la rue » (translation : « To call out the
“climate urgency,” youth has conquered the streets »).
3According to the Fridays for the Future website, more than 1.5% of the Swiss
population participated in demonstrations making it the third country with the
highest participation rate in the world after Austria and Italy. For details see:
https://fridaysforfuture.org/what-we-do/strike-statistics/map-percentage/.
4As an example of the success and institutionalisation of the environmental
movement, one could mention that Switzerland was the first country in the
world to elect a Green representative in a national election in 1979.
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environmental preferences than older generations do. However,
the analysis also reveals that the change has been progressive with
each generation being slightly more pro-environment than its
predecessor is and that all generations moved in parallel over the
last 10 years becoming significantly more pro-environment
during that decade. Overall, those results show that there is no
strong generational cleavage regarding environmental protection
in Switzerland.
In the next section, we first review the literature that links age,
generations, and political activism as well as environmental
preferences. Building on existing research on youth social
movement activism and political attitudes, we formulate two
expectations related to youth participation in the climate strike
and their environmental preferences compared to older citizens.
In addition, we propose two accounts of changes over time in
environmental attitudes. Next, we track environmental protest
waves in Switzerland to identify environmental generations.
Then, we present the data, our operationalization of key
variables, and the methods that we use to compare generations
and to track changes over time. Lastly, we present and discuss our
findings and we conclude with a discussion of the limits of our
paper as well as avenues for further research.
Age, Activism, and Political Preferences
Successful social movements span multiple generations and
contribute to social change through different processes. In this
paper, we first analyze the composition of climate strike
demonstrations in terms of age to see which generations
participate in these protest events. Here, we build on the
literature on biographical availability (McAdam, 1986;
Wiltfang and McAdam, 1991) and the effects of social
movements on political socialization (Caren et al., 2011). In
addition, we consider two alternative accounts of how social
movements contribute to social change. These contrasting views
are associated with the study of generational changes (Mannheim,
1970) and that of post-materialism (Inglehart, 1977).
The literature on youth political participation often studies
youth political disengagement (Henn et al., 2002; Amnå and
Ekman, 2014; Dahl et al., 2018). Research shows that young
people tend to be less engaged than older citizens in institutional
politics but they do participate in politics through other means
(O’Toole, 2003; Earl et al., 2017). An extensive literature argues
that youth are more likely to engage in social movements. It is
commonly held that young activists, are more progressive than
the rest of society (Milkman, 2017). However, what is more
important is their biographical availability defined as “the
absence of personal constraints that may increase the costs
and risks of movement participation” (McAdam, 1986: 70).
These personal constraints relate to family and employment
situation. Those individuals who are not in a stable
relationship and are still studying are deemed more “available”
to engage in protest activities, namely that they have more time
that could be dedicated to protest. In addition to biographical
availability, Schussman and Soule (2005) examine political
engagement and structural availability. Political engagement
refers to political attitudes such as political interest and
efficacy, while structural availability relates to participation in
civil society organizations and other networks that promote
political activism. In other words, young people are more
likely to engage in political activism because they have the
time, the interest, and the networks. This comes close to the
famous civic voluntarism model which explains that people
engage because they want to (political attitudes including
openness and willingness to change society), they can (political
resources including time), and because they have been asked
(Verba et al., 1995).
This suggests that citizens protest when they are young and
then refrain from political participation or turn to institutional
politics. However, research shows that individuals who came of
age in periods of intense political mobilization remain more
active in protest politics throughout their lives (Caren et al.,
2011; Grasso, 2014; Giugni and Grasso, 2019). These individuals
form social movement generations who adopt specific action
repertoires in which protest is more prominent. In addition,
these early political experiences shape how they understand
subsequent political events (Bartels and Jackman, 2014). Thus,
lending support to Mannheim’s theory of generational change.
Young people who experience their formative years in a given
historical and social period belong to a generation (Mannheim,
1970). A generation is a group of persons who come of age at the
same time and share a lived experience of this historical period.
Although individuals may hold different values depending on
their socioeconomic standing and partisanship, this means that
they share similar understandings of the world. Not all periods
are equally likely to have a strong impact on youth. Intense
periods of social change are more likely to have a durable impact
on youth understanding and perception of the world around
them, thus to influence their values and their behaviors (Rochon,
2000). Sometimes, these periods of social change are tied to
protest waves, phases of heightened political conflict (Tarrow,
1989), during which protest events regularly take place. These
movements question prevailing understandings of society and
propose alternative models. These events contribute to young
people’s political socialization. Youth learn to see the world
through specific lenses. Young people acquire political values
as they discuss with their peers in periods of intense political
mobilization, but also within the family. Jennings et al. (2009)
analyze these processes and show that transmission of political
values within a family are stronger when these values are salient in
the broader political context. Hence, when environmental issues
are high in the political agenda there is a stronger transmission
within families of political values and environmental concerns.
Giugni and Grasso (2019) observe that two generations who came
of age in periods of intense mobilization are more active on the
streets than other generations.
Other studies show that social movements transform society
more thoroughly, they influence not only young people who
belong to those social movement generations but society as a
whole (Amenta and Polletta, 2019; Rochon, 2000). In this vein,
researchers argue that western societies have embraced post-
materialistic values (Inglehart, 1977). The idea is that social
movements’ influence reaches broader segments of society and
transforms the political values across different generations. In this
case, there are two implications for action repertoires and political
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values. In terms of action repertoire, it relates to the idea of a
normalization of protest which means that protest is a frequent
mode of political action used by more diverse social groups and
increasingly building on professional social movement
organizations (Tarrow, 2011 [1994]). When it comes to
political attitudes, this would mean that social movements
contribute to the diffusion of new political values in society
and, therefore, generations are indistinguishable in terms of
political attitudes. Thus, it requires to understand how specific
age groups form preferences with regard to environmental issues
and how these preferences evolve over time to understand the
dynamics of public opinion and how generational change might
affect the aggregate preferences of the public over time. Or, in
other words, to understand whether age has become a new
cleavage structuring environmental politics as a consequence
of the rise of environmental issues. Previous accounts put little
emphasis on this structural element (Kissau et al., 2012; Goldberg,
2016). For those reasons, it is of importance to study the impact of
age and generations on environmental attitudes.
Age and Pro-environmental Attitudes
Existing research on the relationship between age, generations,
and environmental attitudes provides rather inconsistent results.
Age and generational effects are discussed in a large number of
studies of public opinion (Franzen and Meyer, 2010), but are
rarely the specific focus of research, usually featuring simply as
control variables. Andor et al. (2018) show that in Germany age is
related with concerns about climate change in a non-linear
fashion with highest degrees of concern being found in middle
age groups and relatively lower levels of concern among the youth
and elderly survey respondents. Attitudes toward public spending
for the environment conform more to the theoretical model as it
is the oldest age categories that are least supportive of such
policies. A similar trend with low levels of support for public
spending for the environment among the elderly have been found
in other contexts including Sweden or the USA (Carlsson and
Johansson-Stenman, 2000; Johnson and Schwadel, 2019). Gray
et al. (2019) focus on differences in attitudes between four
generations and show that there is hardly any difference
between them regarding their level of environmental concern
and the actions they would be ready to take to protect the
environment.
There is little research focusing specifically on age or
generational effects on pro-environmental attitudes in
Switzerland. Existing studies show that attitudes toward the
environment are similar across age groups in Switzerland. For
instance, Franzen and Vogl (2013) show that despite an increase
in media attention to environmental issues since the 1990s public
opinion has on average moved very little in relation to these issues
between 1993 and 2010. Furthermore, no effect of age was found
regarding environmental concern and willingness to pay for the
environment. Another study focusing on post-electoral survey
data in 2007 has shown that environmental protection is the issue
about which there was the highest level of agreement between age
groups with issues such as same sex marriage or the intervention
of the state in the economy being much more divisive along
generational lines (Kissau et al., 2012). Beiser-McGrath and
Huber (2018) show that preferences of Swiss respondents are
much more closely associated with psychological rather than
sociodemographic factors. Similarly, in a recent survey of public
opinion on how the covid-pandemic might affect the
environment, all age generations held similar opinions with
clear majorities believing that the economy will be given
priority over the environment in the long run (Monsch et al.,
2020).
All in all, existing research does not show compelling evidence
for the existence of systematic age or generational gaps in
environmental concerns and policy preferences in Western
democracies. One of the limitations of the current literature is
that it mostly relies on cross-sectional data (see however, Johnson
and Schwadel, 2019) and thus does not address the issue of how
generations might change over time or how specific events might
moderate the effect of age on preference. Also, no study, to the
best of our knowledge, focused specifically on very young
individuals and there is a risk of overseeing some large age
differences that would be visible only among youngest
generations.
Environmentalism: Youth, Generational, or Social
Change
In the empirical part of our study, we examine generational
differences in environmental protest participation and pro-
environmental attitudes. First, regarding protest action
repertoires, the literature on biographical availability suggests
that we should expect a gap in relation to the participation of
various age groups in protest events associated with the
environmental movement with young adults making up the
bulk of protesters. There are, however, reasons to believe that,
given the long history of activism around environmental issues in
Switzerland, members of older age groups (i.e., individuals of the
environmental movement generations) also joined the
movement, which revived some of the topics that were on the
agenda of former movements. Hence, we examine the
composition of the climate strike movement in terms of
generations. We expect to observe an encompassing
movement bringing different generations to the streets.
In the second part, we compare pro-environmental attitudes
of different generations in 2017 and over time. Here, we consider
two mechanisms of change over time. The first postulates that,
independent of the age of the individual, the broader political
context shapes political attitudes and behaviors. Hence, not only
young people who come of age during a period of intense
environmental mobilization adopt environmental attitudes but,
to some extent, all citizens do. This means that all generations will
be more preoccupied by the environment over time. In this case,
we should observe an upward trend in environmental preferences
across all generations. The second relates to generational change,
we postulate that being socialized in a period of intense
environmental mobilizations forms stable predispositions
toward the environment that translate into specific attitudes
and actions. If this is the case, the share of citizens who
prioritize the environment should remain stable over time
within a specific generation. In addition, we should observe
variations between generations socialized in more intense
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periods of environmental mobilization, namely those coming of
age around 1973 (the occupation of Kaiseraugst) and around
1986 (the Chernobyl accident). From that perspective, the greater
concern for environmental issues among younger individuals
would be linked to the fact that they grew up in contexts in which
environmental issues became more salient. In this case, we
anticipate a higher concern for environmental issues among
generations of youth who experienced environmental
movements in their formative years.
Environmental Movements and Climate
Strike in Switzerland
One of the key features of the environmental movement is its
success. As Touraine argues, major social transformations in the
post-industrial society are associated with this movement (cited
in Rootes, 2004; Giugni and Grasso, 2015). Although it is difficult
to assess social movement outcomes, Rucht (1999) argues that the
success of the environmental movement can be evaluated in
relation to four elements. First, the movement grew importantly
with more sympathizers and more resources available. It also
consolidated, in part thanks to institutionalization with the
creation of Green parties and many large environmental
organizations that collaborate with the state. Giugni and Grasso
(2015) argue that the institutionalization is a key feature of the
movement. Second, the movement is an important agenda setter.
Environmental issues are not only high in the political agenda, but
also in citizens’minds and preoccupations. This is its third impact,
the environmental movement transformed citizens’ political
attitudes and behaviors. Lastly, it contributed to the rise of a
new economic sector and to new technologies. In relation to all
these elements, the ecological movement has contributed, at least to
some extent, to social changes. It reached broad segments of the
population through the creation of environmental organizations,
including green parties, and contributed to the diffusion of
environmental attitudes in the population. This latter point is
most important for us here and we will examine in the empirical
section to what extent this claim is true among the Swiss
population.
Environmental Protest Waves in Switzerland
The Swiss environmental movement is amongst the strongest in
Europe, it benefits from a large anchorage in society with many
formal organizations and broad membership (van der Heijden
et al., 1992). The expansion and diversification of social
movements are often associated with protest waves. Although
the Swiss movement is less contentious than the German one (van
der Heijden et al., 1992), several important protest waves shaped
the movement and contributed to its expansion. Figure 1
presents protest events associated with the ecological and
antinuclear movements in Switzerland between 1975 and 2011.5
In Figure 1, we observe a first period of environmental
mobilization in the period 1977–1981. This relates to and
follows the occupation of Kaiseraugst to oppose the project to
construct a nuclear plant on that site (Giugni, 2019).6 A first
protest took place in 1973 and, then, in 1975 activists occupied
the site for ten weeks. The Federal Council abandoned the project
in 1988. Another intense period of mobilization appears during
the period 1985–1991, with a clear peak in 1986 when 31 protest
events took place. This peak is associated with national and
international events that triggered protest. At the national
level, a chemical accident in Basel7 and, at the international
level, the Chernobyl accident.8 In 1990, the Swiss people voted
on a popular initiative demanding to stop constructing nuclear
plants. Activists who campaigned on this issue also organized
protest events to gain visibility in the media for anti-nuclear and
ecological arguments.
Later, during the 1990s and 2000s, the environmental protest
scene is more quiet. In the 1990s, the ecological movement
mobilized around two issues: the death of forest and acid rain.
In 2004, ecologists mobilized against chemical waste dump and
GM food experiments in Swiss universities. There is again a peak
in 2011 with the anti-nuclear mobilization that followed the
Fukushima disaster. Antinuclear protesters gather every year
in Beznau (a nuclear plant in central Switzerland) calling for
the closure of one of the oldest nuclear plants in Europe still in
operation. In 2011, the movement mobilized 20,000 protesters as
well as numerous ecological organizations and political parties,
the highest mobilization since 1986.
FIGURE 1 | Environmental protest events in Switzerland (1975–2011).
Note: Sources Marco Giugni (1975–1995) and Swen Hutter (1995–2011).
Protest events were identified and retrieved from national newspapers.
5The early period from 1975 until 1995 is drawn from Giugni (2004) and for the
years 1996–2011 we used data collected by Hutter (2014). Both datasets are
collected following the same method, protest events are identified in the
Monday edition of the NZZ (see Hutter and Giugni, 2009 for more information).
6(see Giugni, 2019 for detailed accounts of ecological and antinuclear protest
events).
7Toxic agrochemicals were dropped in the Rhine River following a fire in a
chemical industry plant (Sandoz chemical spill).
8Following the Chernobyl accident, in 1986, 30’000 people marched to Gösgen
nuclear plant.
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In 2019, youth have initiated the climate strike movement. For
citizens who are young, this movement represents the first
opportunity to engage in environmental protest events. The
climate strike movement famously initiated in Sweden when
Greta Thunberg sat in front of the Swedish parliament to call
for strong action on climate change. In Switzerland, the
beginnings can be traced back to the first action that gathered
about 500 climate strikers, most of whom were school students in
Zürich on December 14, 2018. A week later, the strike gathered
around 4,000 participants across three Swiss cities (Basel, Bern,
and Zürich). It quickly became a national movement and climate
strikes were organized in sixteen cities and towns on January 18,
2019. Throughout 2019 and until March 2020 events were
organized on at least eighteen occasions in a total of about 30
different cities across the country.9 Most of the events planned in
the spring of 2020 had to be canceled due to the Covid-19
pandemic and the limitations for public gatherings that were
decided by the Swiss government. However, the movement
remains mobilized despite the strict measures in place, as the
occupation of the square in front of the Federal Palace during the
fall 2020 parliamentary session demonstrated.
Environmental activism has been present in Switzerland for
decades; previous generations took to the streets and used protest
events to express their environmental concerns. Opportunities
for environmental sensibilization, thus, abound since at least half
a century.
Environmental Movement Generations in Switzerland
Neil Caren et al. (2011) refer to the Americans who came of age
during the mobilizations of the 1960s and 1970s as the social
movement generation. Other studies working on different
countries also identified this generation as the most active in
terms of protest participation (Giugni and Grasso, 2019). In this
paper, we seek to construct political generations related to a specific
social movement, namely the environmental one. There are different
ways to group individuals in terms of cohorts (people born in specific
years) or generations (people born in longer periods that experience
historical changes in society). In this paper, we construct three
environmental movement generations that correspond to the
individuals who were young during periods of intense political
mobilization around environmental issues. Previous work
identified the period that range from 15 to 25 years old as the
impressionable years—political events have amore lasting impact on
individuals’ political preferences, they shape how they view
subsequent political events (Bartels and Jackman, 2014; Grasso,
2014). We consider that the formative years cover the premarital
period—the average age of marriage in 1973 was 27 for men and 25
for women (Rosillion, 2008). Hence, we include all persons whowere
aged between 16 and 28 years old at the peak of the protest wave.
Following this procedure, we constructed the Kaiseraugst generation
around the 1973 protest wave and the Chernobyl generation around
the 1986 protest wave. We compare them to an older generation
including all those who were born during the war (WWII) and the
pre-war period, as well as to a younger generation of people born in
the 1970s and early 1980s. The younger generation overlaps between
generations XY depending on how the age range is defined, however
the cut off year for generation X and Y is set around 1977/1978
(Jorgensen, 2003). Table 1 presents in detail birth years included in
the different generations. Lastly, we consider the Climate Strike
generation—those individuals who were young during the protest
events organized by the Fridays for Future movement in 2019.
DATA AND METHOD
For this study, we use original Climate Strike data (CS) and the
Swiss Household Panel (SHP). The CS data allows us to examine
the generational composition of the climate strike
demonstrations. Whereas, the SHP, offers a longitudinal
overview of environmental attitudes of different generations
among the general population.
Climate Strike Survey and Swiss Household
Panel
The climate strike data were collected in the framework of a large
coalition of research teams across different countries (Wahlström
et al., 2019; deMoor et al., 2020). The Swiss data were collected by
the leading author during three demonstrations: two that took
place on March 15th, 2019, in Geneva and in Lausanne, and one
in Bern on September 28th, 2019. During each of these three
demonstrations a team of students and researchers distributed
1,000 flyers to access an online survey about their current
participation in the demonstration, their political attitudes,
their political behaviors, and socio-demographic control
variables. The participants were selected using a procedure to
randomize the selection and to construct a representative sample
of participants in the demonstration (Walgrave and Verhulst,
2011). As we handed out flyers to access the online survey, we
asked one in five potential survey respondent to fill a small
questionnaire to assess the sociodemographic profile, political
attitudes, and relation to protest of the people who participate in
the different demonstrations. This allows us to analyze the
composition of the event and, thus, to gain knowledge about
the population from which the sample is drawn. We compare
survey respondents to demonstrators in terms of
sociodemographic profiles (sex, age, and level of education),
political attitudes (political interest), and relation to protest
(prior participation in demonstrations, timing of the decision
to participate in this demonstration). In so doing, we can assess
how representative the sample is. Comparing survey respondents
to street demonstrators, we identified one systematic bias, those
demonstrators who are interested in politics are more likely to
answer the online survey than participants invited to fill in the
online survey who are not interested in politics. The response rate
for the three demonstrations range from 15 percent in Geneva to
29 percent in Bern and the total sample includes 608 respondents
(see Table A1).
9These estimations are based on the information provided on the website of the
movement itself: https://de.climatestrike.ch/wiki/Klimastreik. They are likely
conservative as, according to the media, at least 170 single climate strike events
took place in 60 different cities in 2019 alone (see e.g. Le Nouvelliste, 26.11.2019).
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Regarding the Swiss Household Panel, we have fourteen
available waves over a period of eighteen years (1999–2017).
In total, we have three samples as the SHP added two refreshment
samples to their original sample of 1999 in 2004 and 2013
respectively. As for every panel study, attrition is one of the
biggest sources for bias. However, existing analyses have shown
that attrition is mostly random and estimate the nonresponse bias
as mild (Voorpostel, 2009). Nevertheless, non-respondents tend
to be younger, male, lower educated, single, with less interest in
politics and civic engagement, as well as equipped with lower
levels of political and social trust. In an attempt to control for
attrition bias, we conducted all analyses twice: once with
standardized longitudinal weights and once without weights.
We include all individuals in our analyses as soon as they turn
sixteen and integrate them in the analysis.10 For example, an
individual who is born in 1994 is included in the analysis from
2010 onwards. This adds up to a sample of 12,931 respondents in
1999 and 12,164 respondents in 2017. Individuals are included
individually and not by groups and the results cannot be
interpreted as within individual changes over time but as
changes between generations over time.
Dependent Variable: Pro-environmental
Attitudes
Our dependent variable are opinions regarding the prioritization
of the environment over the economy. When working on
environmental attitudes, it is important to ask what it means
to be concerned by environmental issues. Working on the idea
that we are now in a post political era, some argue that the issue of
climate change is a consensual one. Almost everyone admits that
this is one of the most pressing issue of our time, yet the issue is
presented in apocalyptic terms that prevent any action from being
taken (Swyngedouw, 2010). The environment is considered as
valence issue, that is an issue on which a vast majority of people
have the same position but give different priority to that issue.
Hence, we need to devise measures of environmental concern that
capture support for the environment as well as the cost of this
action. We argue that environmental concern can be measured
when real choices are offered as for example to prioritize the
environment over the economy. This means that people are ready
to give up growth and eventually some of their material well-
being to promote an alternative relation to the
environment—that is not one of extraction and exploitation.
In fact, the climate strikers called for “system change and not
climate change” in the framework of the protest events that we
analyze.
In the SHP, we have a question measuring this tradeoff. The
question asks: “Are you in favor of Switzerland being more
concerned with protection of the environment than with
economic growth, or in favor of Switzerland being more
concerned with economic growth than with protection of the
environment?”11 It is measured on a three-state interval variable:
“in favor of stronger protection of the environment,” “neither,”
“in favor of stronger economic growth.” We dichotomize the
variable opposing those who say they support stronger
environmental protection to all others (those who support
neither and those who support stronger economic growth).
Independent Variable: Age and Generations
To study the relation between generations and pro-
environmental attitudes, we construct five generations that
correspond to the generations identified in relation to
environmental protest waves in Switzerland (see Table 1). For
the CS data, we consider the age of the respondent in 2019
whereas, for the SHP, we consider the age in 2017 (the last
available wave of the panel with the environmental question).
When constructing these five generations, we observe that the
prewar/war generation includes very few respondents in the CS
data (see Table A2). Hence, we do not consider this generation in
the analyses of the CS.
RESULTS
Climate Strikers: Youth or Cross-Age Call
for Action?
During the year 2019, climate strikers took to the streets to
express their worries and their dissatisfaction with how the
government is handling the issue of climate change. Many
observers around the world qualified this protest wave as a
“youth movement,” in fact many school pupils and students
engaged in these actions. However, in the Swiss case, climate
TABLE 1 | Generations, protest year, and birth years.
Generations Peak of protest Age during protest years Birth years Age in 2019
Prewar/war — — <1945 >74
Kaiseraugst 1973 16–28 1945–1957 62 to 74
Chernobyl 1986 16–28 1958–1970 61 to 49
X and Y — — 1971–1990 48 to 29
Climate strike 2019 16–28 2003–1991 28 to 16
10At fourteen, respondents fill out for the first time the individual questionnaires
including all the variables of interest here.
11Original versions of the question in German, French, and Italian are available on
the SHP website: https://forscenter.ch/projects/swiss-household-panel/. The
question was asked in all years between 1999 and 2009 and then in 2011, 2014,
and 2017. The question will also be asked in the 2020/21 version of the survey that
is still in the field at the time of writing this manuscript.
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strikers mobilized across age categories. Figure 2 shows that the
climate strike generation constituted an important share of
demonstrators in the early phase of the protest (56.4 percent),
whereas in September 2019 they represent only a third of all
demonstrators (35.3 percent). By the fall, the movement mobilized
far beyond schools and universities including an increasing share of
people from older generations. In particular, the share of
demonstrators who belong to the generation X and Y increased
(from 17.0 to 31.6 percent). Regarding the two environmental
generations, we observe two distinct trajectories. While the share of
demonstrators who belong to the Chernobyl generations increased
(from 14.0 to 22.4 percent), the share of demonstrators who belong
to the Kaiseraugst generation remains stable over time (11.6 vs. 9.9
percent). We also examined the age distribution and we observe a
peak among the very young participants, less than 20 years old
(figure presented in Figure A1). Climate strike demonstrators aged
17 years old display the highest percentage with 7.4 percent of the
overall sample. Similarly, 18 and 19 years old have slightly higher
percentages than age groups of the climate strike generation
(respectively 6.3 and 6.6 percent). In the other three
generations, we do not observe any clear pattern. Overall, we
find that all age categories are present within each generation.
Figure 2 shows that the climate strikers are not all young. In
the fall, the climate strikers who took to the street include a cross-
generational coalition of citizens. Interestingly, the
environmental generations (Kaiseraugst and Chernobyl)
represent a small share of the climate strikers. They add up to
a quarter of all demonstrators in March and about a third in
September 2019. Whereas, the generation X and Y, which did not
experience any major environmental protest wave when they
were young, are as active as the younger (climate strike)
generation. This shows that far from being a youth movement,
the climate strike movement is an encompassing movement. It
brought different generations to the streets of Swiss cities in 2019.
In spite of the presence of different generations on the streets,
these findings show little support for the idea that the
environmental generation remain more active in protest over
time.We find that the generation X and Y who did not experience
environmental protest waves when they were young joined the
climate strike generation on the streets of Swiss cities in 2019.
Our findings also show that members of the Kaiseraugst
generation were equally present on the streets at the onset of
the movement in March 2019 and in the fall. Providing some
support for the idea that early socialization in protest might
contribute to future protest and more specifically for abeyance
theory (Taylor, 1989)—individuals who belong to the
Kaiseraugst generation might have remained active in
environmental organizations and, therefore, can more rapidly
be mobilized for protest events in line with this political
engagement. Let us now move to the dynamic perspective
and seek to understand how change happens, through period
effects when the whole population moves up or through
generational effects.
Changes in Environmental Attitudes in the
Swiss Population
Descriptive analyses of environmental attitudes among different
generations provide us with some useful hints regarding how
changes in environmental attitudes take place. Figure 3 displays
the share of respondents who favor the environment over the
economy for the five generations over time. In line with current
recommendations (see e.g., Julious, 2004), we present these
estimates with 84% confidence intervals. The 84% confidence
intervals allow to assess visually whether differences in the means
across groups (or in that case also across years) are significant at
p < 0.05. If the confidence intervals do not overlap, the difference
between the means is significant. The picture that emerges from
Figure 3 is quite telling regarding differences in pro-
environmental attitudes be they related to age, generation, or
period. Overall, two trends emerge from this picture. First, at any
given point in time, younger generations are more likely to be on
average more favorable to the environment than older
generations. While adjacent generations do not strongly differ
from each other, significant differences exist between more
removed ones.
Although differences across generations are relatively small,
the overall picture shows greater environmental concern among
younger generations. Most importantly, it appears that
generations evolve in parallel and seem to respond to more
general trends in society toward an increase in environmental
concern. This lends support to the idea that the whole society is
holding more pro-environmental attitudes over time. For
instance, in all generations, pro-environmental attitudes have
increased during the 2003 to 2007 period as well as between 2009
and 2019. These results show that environmental concerns are
related to the broader political context and increase over time
across generations.
In order to examine the idea that change is specifically connected to
generations who came of age in periods of intense environmental
FIGURE 2 | Generations among climate strikers who took to the streets
in March 2019 (Lausanne and Geneva) and September 2019 (Bern).
Note: We run a chi-square test to compare respondents who belong to
the different generations in March and September 2019. We find that
differences in the share of respondents from the Climate strike, the X and
Y, as well as the Chernobyl generations reach conventional levels of
statistical significance. There are less members of the Climate generations
in September and more members of the generations X/Y and Chernobyl.
The Kaisergaust is equally present in protest events that took place in
March and in September 2019.
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protest, we zoom on these generations. The Kaiseraugst generation
appears to be closely aligned with the pre-/war generation. We do not
observe a major gap between these two generations when it comes to
their environmental attitudes. In fact, the environmental preferences
of these two generations do not differ from a statistical perspective as
can be seen in Figure 3 thanks to the confidence intervals. However,
when we compare the pre-/war generation to the Chernobyl
generation the gap appears to increase. The environmental
preferences of the Chernobyl generation do not differ from those
of the Kaiseraugst generation from a statistical point of view. Yet, the
environmental preferences of the Chernobyl generation are
significantly different from those of the pre-war and war
generation. This relates to the idea that there are no major gaps
between older and younger generations that cohabit within a given
society since intermediary generations create bridges (Mannheim,
1970). The Kaiseraugst generation paved the way for the Chernobyl
generation, which pushed up more significantly the share of citizens
who hold pro-environmental attitudes and differs more from older
generations. This is confirmed when we compare the younger
generations to older ones. Statistically significant difference appears
when we compare the climate strike and the X and Y generations to
the Kaiseraugst and Prewar/war generations. However, only the
climate strike generations systematically differs from the Chernobyl
generation in terms of environmental preferences.
DISCUSSION
Previous research has shown that youth are particularly likely to
participate in social movements. It is also clear by analyzing the
development of the climate strike movement in Switzerland that
it has been initiated by young individuals, mostly school students,
echoing what has happened in other countries. This central role
of youth in initiating the movement is actually common for the
emergence of many social movements, however often it is more
associated with university students (e.g., May 68 movement, the
Indignados, Black Lives Matter). What is specific about the
climate strike movement is that it was initiated in schools thus
by individuals who by and large did not have citizenship rights
due to their very young age. Based on the media accounts of the
climate strike movement we would expect that protesters were
almost exclusively very young. However, given the long history of
environmental politics in Switzerland, we anticipated that
members of older generations who possibly participated in
previous waves of environmental protest, would join the
climate strike movement. Indeed, we observe that older
citizens drawn from both their parents and their grandparents’
generations have joined young people on the streets in the fall of
2019. In September 2019, youth represent only a third of the
100,000 protesters who took to the streets.
Regarding environmental attitudes, it is of course tempting to
think that the emergence of the climate strike movement reflects a
large gap in environmental preferences and concerns across
generations. After all, if pupils who were in school took the
street in 2018/19 and those who were in a similar situation a
decade before did not, it must mean that they hold different
preferences. The current youth generation has indeed been
exposed to more information about climate change than any
other and there are reasons to believe that it has a better
understanding of this issue than its predecessors at the same
age. In addition, one could argue that this generation is more
likely than others to be conscious of the fact that it will be
dramatically affected by climate change. The prevalence of public
discourse about climate make it clear for youth that they will be
personally affected, which might be less obvious for generations
whose remaining life expectancy is shorter. However, the
information to which the current youth generation is exposed
to is actually not specific to them and other generations might be
affected by this information as well. Also, given the already visible
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FIGURE 3 | Share of respondents who believe that the environment is more important than the economy in different generations and over time.
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any generation might feel potentially unaffected by it. It is
therefore unlikely that there is an abyssal gap in the
environmental policy preferences between generations.
We show that the current youth generation holds more pro-
environmental attitudes than its predecessors. Moreover, we
show that the share of pro-environmental preferences has
been increasing from one generation to the other, given that
the attention brought to environmental issues has been growing
since the 1990s at least (Franzen and Vogl, 2013). Hence, we
observe an overall greening that spans across age categories and
we do not find empirical support for the idea that some
generations, given their exposure to social movements’
environmental ideas during their formative years, are more
likely to hold pro-environmental attitudes.
CONCLUSION
We started with the commonly held belief that the climate strike is a
youthmovement and that young people holdmore pro-environmental
attitudes. Using protest event data, climate strike survey, and
longitudinal data, we deconstruct these ideas. We show that climate
strikers who took part in the national demonstration in Bern were
drawn fromall generations. In addition, the SwissHousehold panel data
show that the gap in pro-environmental attitudes between youth and
older respondents is only limited. Looking at the Swiss population as a
whole it appears that youth have more pro-environmental preferences
than older generations. However, each generation has been more pro-
environmental than its predecessor has. This already lends support to
the idea that generations live together and that ideas travel across
generations. In fact, our analyses of longitudinal data shows that
different generations tend to adopt more pro-environmental
attitudes at the same time. Thus, pointing to a period effect. In
addition, we find limited evidence that the generations coming of
age in periods of intense environmental mobilization hold more pro-
environmental attitudes than other generations.
In this paper, we examined generational differences in protest
participation and pro-environmental attitudes. First, we situated
the climate strike in a broader understanding of the environmental
movement in Switzerland. Protest event data shows that several
protest waves took place over the period 1975–2015. This is
important because it means that previous generations mobilized
to defend the environment when they were young and this might
have multiple long-term consequences. First, it might durably
shape the environmental attitudes of those who participated in
these protest waves but also of others who were coming of age at
the time of this event. This corresponds to the idea of generations
socialized in periods of intense social change and durably marked
by this experience. Second, the environmental ideas at the core of
these mobilizations might contribute to broader social change. The
movement results in the creation of institutions (both political
parties and environmental organizations) that seek to influence
public opinion through different means. Theymight act directly on
decision-making processes within political institutions but they
also seek to gain media attention. Overall, this means that
environmental attitudes may travel in society through multiple
routes following different protest waves.
Building on the information about environmental protest waves
in Switzerland, we identified generations of young people that came
of age during intense periods of environmental mobilization. Those
who were young during the Kaiseraugst occupation, those who
were young when the Rhine River pollution and Chernobyl
accident happened, and those who were young as the climate
strike demonstrations took to the streets. Our longitudinal
analyses show that the climate strike generation stand out
and hold more pro-environmental attitudes than any other
generation. However, they are still young at the time of our
study so we cannot say whether this relates to youth or to a
specific socialization of this young generation that will hold
throughout their life. When we turn to the other two
environmental generations, we find that the Kaiseraugst and
the Chernobyl generations do not stand out in terms of
environmental preferences. Instead, they appear to be part of
a more general trend in society—the diffusion of pro-
environmental attitudes across all age groups and generations.
From a policy perspective our results are mixed. On the one
hand, they show that there are no clear generational cleavage on
environmental issues in Switzerland. This suggests that there is
room for finding broad coalitions that encompass all generations
to protect the environment. On the other, these results also make
it clear that overall changes in the opinions of citizens are
relatively slow. While the share of environment supporters has
increased across all generations over the last decade, the pace of
this change might be seen as insufficient to address the urgent
environmental challenges linked with climate change.
Finally, it is important to note some of the limits of our
research. We are not able to identify respondents who
participated in the environmental mobilization in the past and
to compare their environmental attitudes to those who did not
participate in the same generation or in other generations. This
means that we are testing the idea that generations socialized in
intense periods of mobilization with data that make the test
difficult to pass. In addition, we are not able to identify the
external effects that might account for the period effect that we
identify. Important events in the environmental movement are
the 2009 mobilization around the COP in Copenhagen. This
event raised high expectations and triggered a broad disillusion
after its failure. However, we do not observe important shifts in
pro-environmental attitudes around this event. Similarly, in 2015,
the COP in Paris was a highly mediatized event. Yet, our data do
not allow following the ups-and-downs in public opinion, instead
we measure aggregate changes within generations. One of the
avenues for future research is to try to disentangle the age, cohort
as well as period effects, which could be achieved by modeling
environmental attitudes at the individual level.
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APPENDIX
TABLE A1 | Climate strike survey information.
City Date Estimated number
of participants
Distributed flyers N Response rate
(%)
Lausanne 15.03.2019 12,000–15,000 1000 183 18
Geneva 15.03.2019 5,000–6,000 1000 154 15
Bern 28.09.2019 100,000 1000 271 29
TABLEA2 | Percentage of respondent in each generation (CS and SHP) and in the
Swiss population (Swiss Federal Office for Statistics—OFS).
Climate strike SHP OFS
Generations Geneva Lausanne Bern Switzerland Switzerland
Climate strike 52.3 59.9 35.3 19.7 15.1
X and Y 19.6 14.8 31.6 24.8 28.3
Chernobyl 13.1 14.8 22.4 24.4 19.2
Kaiseraugst 13.7 9.9 9.9 20.4 13.3
Prewar/war 1.3 0.6 0.7 10.7 9.2
N 153 182 272 12,003a 8,419,550b
aThe percentages presented here and the N are calculated on the 2017 SPH wave.
bThe percentages do not add up to 100 percent because the table does not present
Swiss residents who are younger than 16 years old (14.9 percent of the population).
FIGURE A1 | Age of climate strikers.
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